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CASE NOTES
Taxation—Attachment Lien Not Entitled to Priority Over Subsequent
Federal Tax Lien.—Manchester Federal Savings and Loan Association
v. Emery Waterhouse Co.1—Following a foreclosure sale of a parcel of
property subject to a real estate mortgage, a bill of interpleader was filed to
determine the rights of a number of claimants to the proceeds of the sale in
excess of the amount paid to the mortgagee. Following the execution of the
first mortgage certain creditors made attachments, a second mortgage was
executed, and a federal tax lien was imposed. The proceedings involved an
application of the Mt. Rev. Code of 1954 § 6323 which provides that the
lien of the United States for taxes "shall not be valid as against any mort-
gagee, pledgee, purchaser, or judgment creditor whose liens . . . " antedate
the tax lien.2 On record questions the Supreme Court of New Hampshire
held, inter alia, that the federal tax lien did not have priority over the
second mortgage but did have priority over the attachments of the creditors
who had not taken judgment and subsequently had not perfected their
inchoate attachment Iiens. 3
The question frequently arises as to whether liens which have attached
prior to the filings of a federal tax lien are entitled to priority over it. The
Supreme Court of the United States has taken the position that only liens
that are perfected and choate are entitled to priority. 4 For a lien to meet
these requirements: (1) the property subject to the lien must be definite,
(2) the identity of the lienor must be established, (3) the amount of the
lien must be in an exact amount and be fixed and determined with finality. 3
Congress, however, has specifically given protection to prior liens of
mortgagees, pledgees, purchasers, and judgment creditors' As the court in
the instant case points out, an attachment lien is neither a perfected lien
because it is contingent upon the creditor getting judgment, nor does it fall
within the class of judgment creditors specifically protected by the Int.
Rev. Code of 1954.7 The creditors in this case in order to protect their
rights would have had to get judgment before the federal tax lien was filed.
Moreover, if this were a case involving personal property, it would seem
that the mere entry of judgment would not be sufficient for the creditors to
preserve their rights. Security would only be obtained by the creditors re-
ducing the property to their ,constructive possession by delivery of a writ of
execution to the sheriff prior to the time that the federal tax lien was filed. 8
1 153 A.2d 918 (N.H. Sup. Ct. 1959).
2 Int. Rev. Code of 1959, § 6323.
3 Two creditors received judgment but had failed to levy execution within thirty
days of judgment as required by N.H. Rev. Stat. ch. 511-55 and therefore had lost
their security rights; Murphy v. Hill, 68 N.H. 544, 44 Atl. 703 (1896). Other creditors
had attached the property, but the actions had been continued for judgment at the
time the federal tax lien was filed. Therefore, they were not judgment creditors; United
States v. Security Trust & Savings Bank, 340 U.S. 47 (1950).
4 United States v. Security Trust & Savings Bank, supra note 3.
5 Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362 (1946).
6 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6323.
7 United States v. Security Trust & Savings Bank, supra note 3.
8 United States v. Levin, 128 F. Supp. 465 (D. Md. 1955). See Mosner, Federal
Tax Liens, 17 Md. L. Rev. 1, 10 (1957).
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Whether a lien fulfills the requirements of specificity stated above is a
matter of federal law. 9
 A state court's characterization of a lien as specific
and choate, while entitled to consideration, is not binding on the federal
courts.'9
 On the other hand, if the state court decides that the lien is
inchoate, as was done in the instant case, this classification is practically
conclusive,"
The doctrine of the inchoate lien has been the subject of severe criti-
cism.'2
 One critic has pointed out that the concept of the inchoate lien as
created by the Supreme Court has subsequently been enlarged to include
practically every lien to be found in American law.' 3 The most valid
criticism seems to be that it does not apply to federal tax liens. The federal
tax lien is not regarded as an inchoate general lien, but a specific and per-
fected lien which without the aid of any subsequent court action attaches to
the property of the tax debtor."
The problem of the inchoate lien probably would not have arisen had
the Supreme Court adhered to a holding that the priority of liens be based
upon a "first in time, first in right theory" which they seemed to follow in an
earlier case.' However, since the Court did not subsequently follow the
rule it has become, in this regard, purely academic." It is felt that Congress
could ameliorate the situation presented in the instant case by providing that
when an attachment lien is followed by judgment, the judgment should re-
late back to the date of the attachment and thereby the priority of the lien
be preserved. There seems to be no indication, however, of any Congres-
sional action in this respect within the immediate future."
THEODORE C. REGNANTE
Taxation—Federal Income—Statutory Interpretation—Useful Life-
Salvage Value.—Hertz Corporation v. United States.'—The corporate
taxpayer was engaged in the business of renting automobiles and trucks,
the former of which had a useful life to it of less than three years but a
physical life of four. In preparing the federal income tax returns for the
years 1954, 1955, and 1956, the taxpayer claimed depreciation on the auto-
mobiles on the basis of the four year physical life using the declining
balance method at a rate of fifty per cent per year on the undepreciated
9 United States v. Gilbert Associates, 345 U.S. 361 (1953).
10 United States v. Waddell, Holland & Flinn, Inc., 323 U.S. 353 (1945).
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 Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. Campbell, supra note 5, at 371.
12 MacLachlan, Improving the Laws of Federal Liens and Priority, 1 B. C. Ind.
& Corn. L. Rev. 73 (1959).
15 Kennedy, The Pernicious Career of the Inchoate and General Liens, 63 Yale
L.J. 905 (1954).
14 Note, 22 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 583, 588 (1954).
15 United States v. City of New Britian, 347 U.S. 81 (1954).
16 Comment, 54 Mich. L. Rev. 829 (1956).
17 MacLachlan, supra note 12, at 82.
1 268 F.2d 604 (3d Cir. 1959).
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